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The NLRB in Transition*
JOHN H. FANNING"
IN THE BEGINNING CONGRESS created the Wagner Act. That beginning was only
27 years ago, a date many of us can remember. What Congress did in 1935
was to introduce a dramatic and revolutionary change in the world of labor-
management relations. For the first time an employer was required by law to
bargain exclusively with the representative selected by a majority of his em-
ployees. For the first time the right of an employer to discharge an employee
for trade union considerations was curtailed by law. Employees were given
a statutory right to form or select unions for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining. Obviously, changes of such magnitude in our industrial economy
did not go unchallenged. All during the Thirties the controversy raged
through the Board and the courts until the Second World War, evoking the
great patriotism of all Americans, put a blanket on internal strife and united
employees, their unions and leaders of industry in a common cause, the sur-
vival of the nation. But with peace came a new challenge, this time against
the abuse of power by unions nurtured on the Wagner Act and the tremen-
dous industrial impetus of the war effort. The country demanded a curb
against secondary boycotts, closed shops, and coercion of those employees who
preferred not to have a union represent them. In 1947, Congress initiated an-
other historic change in labor-management relations-the Taft-Hartley Act.
For the first time Congress forbade unions to engage in or induce strikes
against employers with whom they had no actual dispute, but who were
caught in the crossfire of the union's dispute with another employer. For the
* An Address presented to the 27th Annual Meeting of the American Retail Federation, in
Washington, D.C., April 26, 1962.
* Member, National Labor Relations Board.
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first time unions were forbidden to coerce employees to join unions and were
held equally liable with an employer when they caused an employer to dis-
criminate against an employee. The reaction of organized labor was at least
as great as that of management after the passage of the Wagner Act. Taft-
Hartley was called a "Slave Labor Act" and tremendous efforts were made to
repeal it in its entirety. The efforts were not successful and in 1959 Congress
passed the Landrum-Griffin Act, adding further restrictions on union activity.
I cite this history of legislative changes in basic Federal labor law for two
reasons. First, for the proposition that the National Labor Relations Act still
is a relatively new and dynamic experiment in our national industrial way of
life. The original Wagner Act and its subsequent amendments indicate that
our country still is groping for a set of statutory rules that will protect the
legitimate rights of employees, unions, and employers and at the same time
safeguard the overriding interests of the public. My second reason for recall-
ing to you these facts of recent history is in answer to current charges that
the Board is now in the throes of tremendous changes and that these changes
are the result of a so-called "New" Labor Board, "New" in the sense that
there have been two new appointees by the current Administration, Chair-
man Frank W. McCulloch and Member Gerald A. Brown-so that the Board
now consists of three Democrats and two Republicans; three Eisenhower ap-
pointees and two appointed by President Kennedy, and yet all of us have one
thing uniquely in common-a comparable background of public service.
Chairman McCulloch and Member Rodgers came to the Board from staff
positions with the U. S. Senate; Member Leedom was a Justice of the Supreme
Court of South Dakota; Member Brown had been a career employee of the
Labor Board for some 20 years, and I had served in the Labor Department
and with the Defense Department as Director of Industrial Relations for the
Military Establishment for many years. This common background of public
service unites us in a common desire to interpret the statute as written by the
Congress and as authoritatively construed by the United States Supreme
Court. Most of our decisions are unanimous. Our differences of interpreta-
tion are relatively few and come generally in those areas where amendments
are recent or congressional intent uncertain.
Obviously, there have been some changes. A forty per cent turnover in top
executive personnel of any corporation would be likely to produce some
change. Historically, the Board has always considered and reconsidered its
policies and rules to meet the needs of our constantly changing industrial
economy. For as a dynamic society does not move in vacuo, so an abstract clas-
sification of tendencies can have only a relative value. Our process of re-exam-
ination and re-evaluation comes not without outside prompting. We have
been impelled to this review by a variety of factors: by the criticisms and sug-
gestions of Congressional studies, such as those of the Cox panel for the Sen-
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ate Labor Committee in 1960, and the reports of the Special House Committee
under Congressman Pucinski in 1961; by the legislative debates and amend-
ments in the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Bill; by the Supreme Court, which in 1959
and 1960 reversed a number of the Board's prior decisions-including four
in one day-and set down new guide lines for the Board's work; by the chang-
ing technological conditions brought to our attention in various new cases,
by our efforts to bring greater stability to employer-employee relationships;
and by changes in the administration of the Agency.
For example, one of the cases the Board lost was the Curtis Bros.1 case and
we lost it 9 to 0. Under the Curtis Bros. rule the then Board majority had
held that picketing for recognition by a minority union was unlawful re-
straint and coercion. This rule was itself a most significant change in inter-
pretation of the Taft-Hartley Act. It was an entirely novel theory unsup-
ported by any legal precedent. While I did not participate in the original
Curtis case. I was required to rule on this issue in several cases that arose early
in my tenure as a Board Member. In the first one, Andrew Brown Company,2
I pointed out that the moral position that a union which had lost an election
should not be permitted to picket, at least for a reasonable period of time,
was most appealing. From a legal standpoint, however, I could not agree with
the majority that the Statute, as then written, prohibited such picketing. The
Supreme Court affirmed my legal position and the Landrum-Griffin Section
8(b)(7)3 amendments legislated my moral feelings into law. Obviously, both
the Supreme Court and the Landrum-Griffin Act had their impact on Board
law, and this was in the direction of change, but change that either returned
the Board to pre-existing interpretation of the law or introduced an entirely
new statutory policy for the Board to effectuate.
Last year the Supreme Court made a profound change in the law as it re-
lates -to exclusive union hiring halls. In the Mountain Pacific case,4 the Board
had held that any exclusive hiring hall agreement would be illegal unless it
contained three protective safeguards, which were that referral must be on
a non-discriminatory basis, that the employer must retain the right to reject
any job applicant referred by the union, and that there must be adequate
posting of the terms of the agreement. Once the Board found an illegal hiring
arrangement, it frequently invoked what was known as the Brown-Olds5 rem-
edy, which required the reimbursement of all dues and assessments collected
by the union from its members. In Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express, Local
357,6 the Court held that the promulgation of the Mountain Pacific doctrine
1 N.L.R.B. v. Drivers Local Union, 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
2 120 N.L.R.B. 1425, 1430 (1958).
1 Pub. L. 86-257, Sept. 14, 1959, 73 Stat. 519; 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(7) (1959).
'119 N.L.R.B. 883 (1957), 127 N.L.R.B. 1393 (1960).
'115 N.L.R.B. 594 (1956).
0 Local 357, Int. Brotherhood of Teamsters v. N.L.R.B., 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
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was a legislative act beyond the power of the Board. Similarly, the Court set
aside the Brown-Olds remedy as punitive rather than remedial. These impor-
tant decisions meant that the Board had to re-think its entire approach to
hiring halls and related union activities. What the Court had said, in effect,
was that the Board could not shift the burden of proof to force a union to
disprove that it had violated the law even though some suspicion might be
aroused by its conduct with respect to certain employees. It was the function
of the General Counsel to introduce substantial evidence that actual discrimi-
nation had been practiced against such employees either by the Union, their
employer, or both. Here, then, is another significant area in which changes,
having nothing to do with the composition of the Board, have been required
during the past year.
The central theme of many of the Supreme Court's reversals of Board de-
cisions has been that the Board has been presuming illegality without estab-
lishing an adequate and supportable factual basis for such presumption, in
other words, a per se theory of jurisprudence which the Court frowns upon.
When you lose two-third's of your cases before the Supreme Court (and that
has been the Board's record over the last two years), I suggest it's time for re-
flection, and the core of our reflection lies in a sincere effort to substitute a
pragmatic ad hoc technique based upon reasonable rules of law for the pre-
vious per se doctrine which the Court has indicated clearly that it disapproves.
There have, of course, been changes at the Board level which do reflect the
approach of the present Board majority. Some of these changes, particularly
as they relate to the right of a Union to picket an employer with whom it has
a dispute, or to publicize the facts of a labor dispute, reflect the Supreme
Court's admonition that the Taft-Hartley Act is a balance of conflicting rights
and interests and should not be effectuated by the use of rigid or inflexible
rules. Others reflect a recognition that picketing in many of its aspects in-
volves the constitutionally guaranteed right of freedom of speech. With that
recognition the Board has weighed more carefully the employees' right to
picket as against the other rights guaranteed by the statute. It was this recog-
nition which prompted my dissent in the original Crown Cafeteria case,7 and,
I believe, the subsequent adoption of that dissent by the current Board ma-
jority. In Fanelli Ford Sales, Inc.,s the union picketed the company to protest
the discharge of its principal employee organizer and to obtain his reinstate-
nient. At issue was whether such picketing was to obtain recognition.
for, if it was, the union had violated Section 8(b)(7)(C)9 because it had pick-
eted for more than 30 da\s without a petition being filed. Chairman McCul-
loch. Member Brown, and myself found that recognition was not the object
- 130 N.L.R.B. 570 (1Q61).
s133 N.L.R.B. No. 163 (1961).
0 Supra note 3.
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of the picketing in this case. In doing so, we overruled the Lewis Food Com-
pany case,1" which was decided in 1956. In that case, a majority of the then-
constituted Board ruled that picketing to obtain the reinstatement of a dis-
charged employee "necessarily" was to compel recognition or bargaining.
During my tenure at the Board, I have frequently expressed my opposition
to this view because it seemed to me to involve an application of a per se doc-
trine in this field. The only Circuit Court which had passed judgment on the
Lewis Food decision also had rejected the view expressed by the majority in
that case.11 In Plauche Electric Inc.,12 the Board reversed a rule known as the
Washington Coca Cola rule.13. The Board had held that when a Union was
on strike against an employer, who had a regular place of business in the local-
ity that could be picketed, it was a secondary boycott to engage in picketing
of that employer at another location where the premises were shared with
other employers. I had dissented on this point in a number of cases. 14 More
important, however, three Circuit Courts of Appeals, the Second Circuit, the
Fifth Circuit, and Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, had
rejected this doctrine of the Board as a per se doctrine that precluded a union
from picketing a company at a location where all of its work was performed
simply because the company had an office where the employees reported at
the beginning and end of the working day. The "new" Board majority re-
versed the Washington Coca Cola rule to the extent that that rule automati-
cally found a violation of the law if the picketed employer had a separate
place of business in the locality. The rule today, which I am convinced is the
correct one, is that this circumstance is only one factor to be considered in
determining whether or not a secondary boycott has occurred.
Changes at the Board level have also occurred in the representation area
where the Board has considerably more discretion to set the rules of the game.
In the recent Paragon Products case,' 5 the Board made a significant change
in its contract bar policy. The precedent examined was a case known as Key-
stone.16 The Board's contract bar policy comes into play when a petition is
filed to represent a group of employees already covered by contract. If there
is no question of the validity of the contract, if it is not of undue length, and
if it is not about to expire, then the Board normally holds that it will bar an
election. This is because the Board deems such contracts to have a desirable
stabilizing effect upon labor-management relations. Many bargaining con-
10115 N.L.R.B. 890 (1956).
USee Douds v. Local 1250, R.W.D.S.U., 170 F. 2d 695 (2d Cir. 1948).
135 N.L.R.B. No. 41 (1962).
13 107 N.L.R.B. 299 (1953).
"4See, for example, California Association of Employers, 120 N.L.R.B. 1161, 1171-72 (1958);
Superior Derrick Corp., 122 N.L.R.B. 52, 62 (1958); Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 127 N.L.R.B.
1327, 1329 (1960).
16 134 N.L.R.B. No. 86 (1961).
Is 121 N.L.R.B. 880 (1958).
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date. Last summer, anticipating that the delegation of representation cases to
our Regional Directors would greatly shorten the period between petitions
for elections and the elections themselves, the Board undertook to review this
rule. Records on case processing since then show that the petition-to-decision
period has, indeed, been greatly shortened. With this in mind, the Board
granted oral argument in the case of The Ideal Electric and Manufacturing
Company, 8 accepted amicus briefs, and after careful consideration, selected
as the cut-off date for cases filed thereafter the date on which the petition was
filed. Any conduct after the Board's processes have been invoked which tends
to prevent a free election will now be considered as the basis for a post-elec-
tion objection. The Board is unanimously of the opinion that this change is
one in the right direction, but we shall, of course, follow closely the develop-
ments under it.
Another recent change in representation procedures involves the appropri-
ate time within which a petition may be filed before the terminal date of an
outstanding contract. In Deluxe Metal Furniture9 the Board established a
period between 150 and 60 days before the expiration of an existing contract
as the proper time for the filing of a petition for a new election. However, the
delegation to the Board's Regional Directors of authority to decide represen-
tation cases has reduced considerably the length of time between the filing
of a petition and an actual election.
This could result in a stranger union winning an election and being certi-
fied substantially before the current contract expired-an obviously undesir-
able situation. Accordingly, to avoid holding an election too far in advance
of the terminal date of the existing contract the Board decided unanimously
in Leonard Wholesale Meats, Inc.2 0 to modify the Deluxe rule by establishing
a period between 90 and 60 days before the end of a contract as the time for
filing a representation petition. We believe that this change will better effec-
tuate the purposes of the Act.
The Board also has recently reexamined another long standing policy in
the case of Kalamazoo Paper Box Corporation.21 This policy has been one of
granting severance to truckdriver groups from established plantwide bar-
gaining units, thus permitting them to be separately represented. Obviously
the theory behind the Board practice of ready severance for this group has
been that truckdrivers generally, by the very nature of their duties and their
considerable absences from the plant, do have interests that tend to set them
apart from plant workers. But in Kalamazoo the Board has reconsidered the
problem and a majority has decided that it will no longer grant a separate
Is 134 N.L.R.B. No. 133 (1961).
- 121 N.L.R.B. 995 (1958).
20 136 N.L.R.B. No. 103 (1962).
' 136 N.L.R.B. No. 10 (1962).
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unit to truckdrivers without an analysis of bargaining as it already exists for
them and of the conditions of their particular employment. We believe that
this type of analysis of each truckdriver severance problem will achieve our
twofold goal of not undermining stable collective bargaining relationships by
our unit findings and at the same time insuring to the employees concerned
their rights to self-organization and a free choice of representatives.
Another quite recent Board decision should also have a stabilizing effect.
I refer to the case of Food Haulers, Inc.,2 2 in which a Board majority has
found that a contract which happens to contain a hot cargo clause will not
thereby cease to bar a petition for an election midterm of that contract. This
is the position I took in an August 1960 case, Pilgrim Furniture Company,
Inc. 23 Chairman McCulloch and Member Brown now view this problem in
the same light. Members Rodgers and Leedom, on the other hand, would treat
a hot cargo clause the same as an unlawful union-security clause for contract
bar purposes. My position, as expressed in Pilgrim, is that a hot cargo clause
is not like an unlawful union-security clause in its effect upon the selection
of a bargaining representative by employees. For instance, a clause which re-
quires that only union members be hired, or that new employees join the
Union within 15 days of employment when the Act gives them 30, tends to
act as a restraint upon those employees desiring to refrain from union activi-
ties. The Board deems it unwise to foster stability on the basis of contracts of
that sort which perpetuate union membership and representation in a man-
ner prohibited by the Act. But a hot cargo clause, such as the one in Pilgrim
whereby the Employer agreed not to purchase materials from any company
where a bona fide labor dispute existed with the contracting union, undesir-
able though that might be, has no parallel effect upon employees in the exer-
cise of their rights under Section 7 and Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. Hence a ma-
jority of the Board in Food Haulers has decided to leave unaffected for elec-
tion-bar purposes those contracts containing what may be hot cargo clauses.
In the pure "hot cargo" area I think it fair to say the Board has strictly en-
forced the prohibitions in Sections 8(e) and 8(b)(4)(A)-"no matter how dis-
guised." A majority of Chairman McCulloch and Members Rodgers and Lee-
dom have gone even farther than Member Brown and I would, interpreting
the phrase "to enter into" in 8(e) more broadly than its literal meaning. But
such cases as Burt Mfg. Co.,24 E. A. Gallagher & Sons,25 Los Angeles Mailers
Union26 and others indicate the entire Board's firm resolution to carry out
the will of the Congress in combating the "hot cargo" and boycott evils.
Among the Board's most recent decisions is one-in line with a recommen-
136 N.L.R.B. No. 36 (1962).
128 N.L.R.B. 910 (1960).
24 127 N.L.R.B. 1629 (1960).
2 131 N.L.R.B. 925 (1961).
21135 N.L.R.B. No. 107 (1962).
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dation by Congressman Pucinski's Committee to which I have previously al-
luded-which I am sure excites a lively interest among lawyers and execu-
tives associated with the retail industry. The case to which I refer, of course,
is May Company Department Stores,27 issued by the Board on April 4 of this
year. The center of the controversy was Cleveland, Ohio where the May Com-
pany operates two department stores employing about 3,000 employees. One
store is located in downtown Cleveland and the other in a suburb. In Febru-
ary of 1958, two unions, the Retail Store Employees Union, Local 880, AFL-
CIO and the Office Employees International Union Local 17, AFL-CIO, be-
came interested in organizing these employees and embarked upon a major
organizational campaign to that end. The Unions employed the standard
organizational methods of employee meetings, handbillings, personal and
telephone contacts, as well as the mass media of newspapers, television and
radio. However, these efforts were stifled to some extent since the Unions did
not have access to any employee list of names and addresses and because sev-
eral television and radio stations, as well as newspapers would not accept
union advertisements. At the same time, the May Company had in effect a
no-solicitation rule which forbade union solicitation among employees on
nonworking or free time as well as working time in the selling areas of the
store. Now while this rule was being enforced, the Employer, through several
of its executives, addressed anti-union speeches to massed assemblies of em-
ployees in groups of anywhere from 70 to 900 at both stores. The speeches
were about 35 minutes in length. These speeches reached virtually every em-
ployee three times, at weekly intervals, during the three weeks immediately
preceding the election. The Unions requested an equal opportunity to reply
which the Employer denied. The election took place on April 28, 1960 and
the Unions lost by a margin of greater than 2 to 1.
The Unions contested the election, charging that the Employer had inter-
fered with the free choice guaranteed to employees by denying the Unions'
request to reply after having made such anti-union speeches. The General
Counsel of the Board issued a complaint, the case was heard, and a majority
of the Board agreed that such employer activity, on these facts, did constitute
a sufficient impairment of the employees' free choice to constitute an inter-
ference with employee organizational rights guaranteed under Section 8(a)(l)
of the Act and the election was set aside and a new election directed.
What is the reason for this ruling? Why should the May Company's en-
forcement of a rule prohibiting employees solicitation on nonworking, or
free time give rise to a union's right of reply after an employer addresses
massed assemblies of employees? This is a legitimate source of concern to re-
tailers, and I will -try to clarify the Board's theory.
First of all, a no-solicitation rule which prohibits solicitation of employees,
"1 136 N.L.R.B. No. 71 (1962).
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by employees on their free time, as did the May Company rule, is generally,
in and of itself, a violation of the Taft-Hartley Act under decisions of both
the NLRB and the Supreme Court since the rule constitutes interference with
the rights of employees to organize. I refer you specifically to a Board and
United States Supreme Court case entitled Republic Aviation Corporation v.
N.L.R.B. 28 Were it not for the fact that the May Company was a retail store,
the rule being enforced therein would have, in and of itself, violated the Act,
but because of the customer-oriented character of the retail department store
business, such a broad rule has been held legal by the Board and the Courts.
The majority felt that the May Company, already having been permitted to
enforce such a broad rule and thereby limiting employee organizational ac-
tivity even as to off-time, the employer could not, if a free and untrammelled
employee choice were to be preserved, address anti-union speeches to massed
assemblies of employees and at the same time deny to an organizing union
any right to counteract the effect of such speeches under similar circumstances.
However, no sooner had the case issued than it was loudly, extensively, and
I believe, inaccurately heralded as a return to the Bonwit Teller doctrine.2
Generally, the Bonwit Teller doctrine, as it finally evolved, provided that
employers, both retailers and manufacturers, were obliged to grant to an or-
ganizing union, upon request, an opportunity to reply to employer speeches.
This "equal opportunity" doctrine was rejected by the Board in the Living-
ston Shirt case30 in 1953. But it is most important to understand, and the May
Company decision makes it clear, that the Board in Livingston Shirt did not
reject the doctrine as applied to retail stores, like the May Company, who
enforce a broad no-solicitation rule which prohibits solicitation among em-
ployees on their free time as well as working time. It is clear that the retail in-
dustry, to that extent, was unaffected by the Livingston Shirt case. In May
Company, the Board did not make new law, it simply followed the precedent
established by prior cases, including the 1953 Livingston Shirt case.
Those who criticize the May Company case insist that regardless of the
Board's position, the Supreme Court in the Nutone case31 held that no union
has any right of reply under any circumstances, including situations where a
retail store is enforcing a no-solicitation rule extending to employees' free
time. However, I believe a careful reading of that case discloses that the Su-
preme Court was interested primarily in balancing, as the court stated, "the
opportunities for organizational communication." The Board felt that the
presence of the May Company's broad rule, coupled with anti-union speeches,
created the sort of imbalance that the Supreme Court desired to avoid. The
- 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
'96 N.L.R.B. 608 (1951).
30 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953).
Si N.L.R.B. v. United Steelworkers of America, 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
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May Company case, in my opinion, did not do violence to the Nutone case,
but rather protected the balance in "the opportunities for organizational
communication" that the Supreme Court intended to preserve.
The Board's only object in deciding cases of this type is to insure a free elec-
tion in which the choice of -the employees will be accurately reflected by the
vote. The May Company case does not mean that retail stores must now open
their doors to smooth the path of any organizational drive. The right of reply
is still quite a limited right, confined to certain particular sets of circum-
stances, and these circumstances must be present before any right of reply
exists. Suppose the May Company had not actively maintained and enforced
such a rule; suppose the May Company had refrained from addressing anti-
union speeches to massed assemblies of employees; suppose the union had
made no request to reply. The positive aspect of all these factors were found
in combination in the May Company case. One must be careful to read this
decision in the light of the particular facts which gave rise to its limited hold-
ing. I am not attempting to minimize the impact of the May Company case,
but I do suggest that this decision should not generate any unwarranted as-
sumptions about what the Board's determination might be on other facts.
Although I have devoted considerable time to a discussion of recent changes
in the interpretation of the Statute, the more important changes during the
past year, in my opinion, are procedural rather than substantive. Of these the
delegation to our Regional Directors of initial decision making and direction
of elections in representation cases is the most significant. The Board has al-
ways been criticized by Congress and the labor bar on the ground that it does
too little and frequently is too late. Part of this criticism may have been justi-
fied. In part, however, the Board, like the courts, was helpless to reduce the
delay in case handling because of the tremendous volume of cases that
required the individual attention of the Board Members. In this area the
Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959 gave the Board a powerful assist by specifically
authorizing the Board to de-centralize the resolution of many representation
questions. This the Board did in May of last year. The results have been most
gratifying. The time required to issue a representation decision by one of our
twenfty-eight Regional Directors is about 45 l ays, contrasted with approxi-
niately 85 days in 1960, when the Board itself issued all decisions. Regional
Directors are producing reports on objections and challenges to elections in
an average time of about 30 days, less than half the time required in 1958.
Moreover, further improvements are anticipated. I wish to emphasize, how-
ever, that the Board has not abandoned its obligation to guide and direct
Board policy in the area of representation law. By appeal of the parties or
by transfer frm the Regional Director on his own motion, the Board con-
tilcs Io (letermine the novel and more dilficuht cases in this field. The time
[Vol. XII
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thus saved has produced dramatic improvement in the handling of unfair
labor practice cases also.
In 1956, for example, a year when the Board received about 5000 unfair
labor practice cases for initial processing, it would have taken a median of
105 days before the General Counsel could issue a formal complaint. Contrast
this with 1961, when over twice as many unfair labor practice cases were filed:
the median time for issuing complaints was actually reduced, from 105 to
about 46 days. In differing degrees, this speed-up is evident at every stage of
Board proceedings. For example, at last report the Board's trial examiners
were issuing intermediate reports in an average time of about 65 days, as con-
trasted with over 90 days less than a year ago. Final Board decisions are also
issuing faster, though the figures may not fully reflect the improvement
achieved, since many cases now issuing are ones that have been bottled up for
a long time. Nonetheless, during the 1961 calendar year, the five-member
Board issued an all-time high of 587 decisions in contested unfair labor prac-
tice cases-over fifty-five percent more than in 1960-and the biggest year in
the Board's history. In so doing, the Board succeeded in reducing its backlog
of unfair labor practice cases from 454 to 363, and we reduced processing time
before the Board by 100 days. But we are still striving for improvement.
In emphasizing these substantial speed-ups that we have recently accom-
plished, I would not want to overlook the fact that, despite our best efforts,
many decisions cannot properly be turned out in a hurry. To do so would in
the long run waste time, since the questions involved would, if decided hap-
hazardly, come back to haunt the Board-and practitioners-in future cases.
I am referring of course to cases involving complex or unusual problems, is-
sues of importance to the administration of the Act as a whole.
I hope that my discussion today has given you the flavor of some of the cur-
rent problems that confront the Board. Complex as these problems are, I can
assure you that all our efforts will be devoted to their resolution in an im-
partial and non-partisan manner that seeks the wisest accommodation be-
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